The rigidity associated with formal international law has induced states and international organizations to resort to declarations, comments, guidelines, and other "informal" international 
I. INTRODUCTION
A rigid treaty making process has induced international organizations, treaty monitoring bodies, nonofficial gatherings of states, and transnational private organizations to adopt a voluminous number of international instruments, which are neither part of treaties nor of customary international law.' As an example, the about the authority of domestic courts provides national courts with domestic political legitimacy for their decisions vis-A-vis litigants and more broadly legislative bodies. Should an informal international instrument be widely present in the legal reasoning of national courts, this would lead us to reconsider political footings for domestic courts' practice in a way not entirely dependent on the domestic political branches' formal consent and approval.
Part II of this Article begins by articulating the meaning of "informal" instruments and the normative position of domestic courts vis-A-vis those instruments. A survey of domestic court decisionsl 2 reveals that informal international instruments permeate into the legal reasoning of national courts. 13 The focus of this Article is to unveil on what basis domestic courts apply 1 4 informal international instruments. '5 While courts may be obligated to engage with nontreaty instruments,' 6 judges more frequently invoke informal international instruments for the persuasiveness of such instruments.1 7 What constitutes persuasiveness is by no means certain and largely left to the discretion of judges. The uncertainty in the normative basis of judicial practices provides domestic courts with an opportunity to invoke informal instruments without any clear-cut constraints. At the same time, this uncertainty cautions some courts and judges in their engagement with informal international instruments. 18 This Article is related to two wider sets of international legal studies. On the one hand, it is part of the engagement of international legal scholarship since the 1950s to unveil the regulatory 14. In this Article, the term "application" includes not only the use of an instrument as a legal basis for courts' final findings but also the use of the instrument as an interpretive guide. We use the terms "to apply" and "to give effect" interchangeably for the purpose of this Article.
15. For the concept of "formality" and "informality," see infra Part II.A. 768 [Vol. 46 role of informal international instruments. 19 A major area of investigation has been "soft" law, 2 0 followed by studies on transgovernmental networkS 21 and informal international law making. 22 The increased international importance of informal instruments has forced international legal scholarship to broaden its perspectives and look beyond traditional formality. This Article's study is part of that movement.
On the other hand, our analysis is adjacent to studies on consistent interpretation 23 and interjudicial communications. This Article does not address these types of interpretative practices, but these practices may likewise involve the application of informal instruments. 25 As to consistent interpretation, courts, in construing domestic law, may refer to treaties that their forum states have not yet ratified. 26 As to interjudicial communications, foreign and 
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For the overview of informal international law making (IN-LAW) project, see Joost Pauwelyn, Informal International Lawmaking: Framing the Concept and Research Questions, in
INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING, supra note 1, at 13. As elucidated by Pauwelyn, cross-border cooperation between "public" authorities qualifies as IN-LAW if it features one of the following informalities: process informality, actor informality, and output informality. Id 
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[Vol. 46 international decisions are also informal unless they are given formal legal effect by domestic law. The practices of consistent interpretation and interjudicial communications have therefore triggered the same questions as those examined in this study: how precisely and on what basis do domestic courts refer to external rules and decisions, and why are some courts more willing to engage in outside materials while others are not. By addressing these questions, this Article provides feedback to the analysis of consistent interpretation and interjudicial communications.
INTERNATIONAL INFORMAL INSTRUMENTS BEFORE
DOMESTIC COURTS
A. International and Domestic Formality vis-d-vis Domestic Courts
The term "formality" is one of the multifaceted lexicons defined in legal, practical, and conceptual terms. 2 7 Here, this Article uses the term in a narrowly defined legal sense. It denotes the legal rules determining that an instrument, standard, or norm is legally binding 28 within a particular political community. Under international law, such legal rules determine whether an instrument qualifies as one of the sources of international law-notably treaties, 27. "Formality" can be defined in many different ways, including the following: (1) a (narrowly defined) legal sense, meaning certain legal requirements (and the conformity to them); (2) a practical sense, denoting procedures, forms, or rituals; and (3) a conceptual sense, signifying determinacy or certainty. The difference between the legal and practical notion of "formality" is illustrated by the status of customary international law; while customary international law meets the formality in a legal sense, custom arises from a nonprocedural manner and is therefore considered "informal" from a practical point of view. For the conceptual use of the term, see, for example, JEAN D' ASPREMONT, FORMALISM AND THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw: A THEORY OF THE ASCERTAINMENT OF LEGAL RULES (2011) .
28. While the notion of legal bindingness itself gives rise to meta-level issues as to what signifies law and its binding nature, this Article does not analyze those issues. The notion of "bindingness" in this Article is, however, different from (1) imperativity and (2) judicial enforceability.
(1) For instance, a treaty is officially binding under international law, but its specific provisions do not always make it imperative to do (or not to do) something. The provisions may be only hortatory. See Pauwelyn, supra note 20, at 125-26. The imperative nature of specific treaty provisions may also appear at domestic courts. See, e.g., Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 46 ALR 625 (Austl.) (regarding the question of whether the terms of the treaty were sufficiently precise to create any binding obligations that could be implemented by legislation); C.M. (2) Also, even if a provision becomes binding in the sense that it has legal force within a particular community, it does not necessarily mean that the provision is judicially enforceable. For instance, in monist states, a treaty may have domestic legal force upon ratification, but this does not mean that the treaty provisions are enforceable before the domestic courts.
custom, and general principles.
2 9 The definition of "informal" instruments here is in the same line as the definition adopted by Aust in his 1986 paper, where he distinguishes on whether an instrument is legally binding.
3 0 Domestic courts are circumscribed by the formality/informality distinction at both the international and national levels. The focus of this Article is on the occasions where domestic courts confront international instruments that meet neither the international nor the domestic test for formality. Among such instruments, this Article focuses on instruments promulgated by treaty monitoring bodies (e.g., the General Comments issued by the Human Rights Committee for the ICCPR), international organizations (e.g., U.N. General Assembly resolutions), and intergovernmental forums (e.g., documents adopted by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)). Although foreign law and judgments can be treated as "informal" instruments vis-a-vis a domestic court, this Article does not include foreign lawjudgments in the scope of this present analysis.
3 1 Likewise, this Article does not focus on standards and documents adopted by transnational nongovernmental entities, such as global industry associations. 37 Although the problem of domestic justification arises with regard to these "incorporated" declarations and schemes, it does so not before domestic judicial venues but rather before the legislative body that absorbed the nontreaty documents into domestic law in the first place.
Second, national courts may resort to international instruments that meet the international formality only (and as such could not be land courts took "into account" international industry standards, which were by no means conclusive but part of the variables in construing the "reasonableness" in this particular case. Id.
33. referred as informal international instruments). An unincorporated treaty in dualist states is a case in point. U.K. courts have addressed, from time to time, the question of whether and how they could apply unincorporated treaties in their decisions. 38 Finally, domestic courts may engage with international instruments that satisfy the international formality in general but do not bind a particular state. In practice, we see examples where courts refer to treaties that their states have not ratified. Canadian courts, for instance, refer to the European Convention on Extradition and its jurisprudence-to which Canada cannot be a party-in interpreting the Canadian Charter. 39 The Peruvian Constitutional Court in EMERGIA SA regarded the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea as part of "soft law" vis-A-vis Peru, given that Peru had yet to sign the convention.
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These three scenarios are contrasted with the Article's focus, namely, the application of international instruments that are informal both internationally and nationally. Unlike the three scenarios mentioned above, the authority of domestic courts is endowed with neither international nor domestic formality. Even though the formality per se does not always suffice in securing the political legitimacy of international instruments at the domestic level, the judicial application of declarations, comments, guidelines, and so forth, would need to be supported by factors other than domestic political branches' formal consent and approval.
In practice, whether a particular international instrument is informal is not always clear, and this ambiguity itself paves the way for judicial engagement with informal instruments. 42 The characterization of apparently informal documents as treaties may simply be due to the misunderstanding of international law by domestic judges; however, it may also be a strategy for courts to bypass questions demanding the basis for their decisions. In turn, the deliberate attempts to stretch the notion of a treaty evidence the judges' recognition that they have questions to answer if they engage in the explicit application of informal instruments.
B. Domestic Courts' Engagement with Informal Instruments
From the limited study of court decisions, we witnessed that informal international instruments adopted by treaty monitoring bodies, international organizations, and intergovernmental forums have been widely invoked by national judges.
3
A common denominator is that informal instruments, in principle, only assume ancillary presence before the courts. Courts invoke declarations and comments, not as an independent and freestanding basis of decisions but to supplement the construction of formal law. While litigants attempted to use informal instruments as an autonomous legal basis for judicial decisions (namely, as the basis against which the wrongfulness of acts or the legality of law is ultimately decided), domestic courts have, not surprisingly, rejected such attempts. These informal instruments-which supplement treaty interpretation-are often ultimately used for the construction of formal domestic law, which is interpreted consistently with international law. This apparently holds true in dualist states. For instance, the Canadian Supreme Court in Suresh referred to the position of the U.N. Committee Against Torture5o and to the Committee's country-specific report 1 in order to interpret the U.N. Convention on Torture, which, in turn, informed the construction of the Canadian Constitution. )). Having considered the treaty provisions, the positions of the treaty body, and foreign decisions, the Canadian Supreme Court concluded that a "better view is that international law rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake. This is the norm which best informs the content of the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter." Id. at 45.
52. Id. at 11-12, 40-41. In Suresh, the Canadian Supreme Court encountered the question of the constitutionality of the order to deport an appellant, a Tamil from Sri Lanka, who alleged that, if deported, he would face a serious risk of being tortured. Despite the ancillary use, informal instruments do influence the outcome of decisions. The degree of impact varies based on the weight accorded to comments, declarations, guidelines, and other informal instruments in each case. Domestic courts often attribute confirmatory value to these informal instruments (or to international law construed by the instruments). meaning to the precautionary principle.
5 9 In this case, the precautionary principle and the Bergen Ministerial Declaration, which gave meaning to the principle, were employed apparently in an ancillary fashion rather than as substantive guide for the interpretation of the statute. 6 0 In the South African case of Jaftha v. Schoeman, the South African Constitutional Court sought assistance from the ICESCR and its General Comment No. 4 to interpret the international concept of adequate housing and "reinforce" the domestic counterpart. 6 1
On the other hand, informal international instruments have also injected new meanings into domestic treaty interpretation, constitutional provisions, and other domestic law, while bringing a material difference to judgments. In the Belgian case of ADS a.o., Flemish League Against Cancer and Leo Leys, for instance, the guidelines and decision adopted by the Conference of Parties had accorded substantive meaning to the constitutional right to health and led the Belgium Constitutional Court to uphold the stringent smoking ban in public places. . In Jaftha v. Schoeman, the Constitutional Court of South Africa decided the question of whether a domestic law that permitted the sale in execution of people's homes to satisfy a debt violated the right to access adequate housing protected under the South African Constitution. Id. at 144 para. 1. Given that in South Africa, the court was constitutionally required to consider international law when interpreting the Bill of Rights, the court sought guidance on the meaning of the right to adequate housing from 65 
III. BINDINGNESS AS A BASIS FOR JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT
The impact of informal instruments on the outcome of decisions and possibly wider domestic jurisprudence gives rise to the question: on what basis may domestic courts invoke a wide range of informal international instruments. A first and partial answer is that despite the informal nature of international rules, national courts may still find a basis in a notion of binding obligation.
A. Bindingness of Instruments in Substance
In one construction, the judicial engagement with informal international instruments is still based on binding legal rules. Here, two possible avenues can be distinguished. First, some instruments that appear to be informal could reflect, in substance, established customary law or the accepted interpretation of treaties.
6 6 In such cases, the judicial engagement with informal instruments would simply be understood as the application of formal international law. For instance, domestic courts have invoked U.N. General Assembly resolutions to provide evidence of a custom's existence. A typical example is the evidentiary use of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the large part of which reflects the Human Rights to deny the existence of a customary obligation to grant asylum. 7 4 Apparently, not all U.N. General Assembly resolutions provide evidence of customary international law. Their provisions must be grounded in state practice and opiniojuis. 75 In Filartiga, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed that "a [U.N.] Declaration creates an expectation of adherence," 7 6 the court did not seem to regard such expectation as sufficient to validate the invocation of the General Assembly resolution. Southern Peru Copper Corporation 7 8 contested the evidentiary use of the 1982 World Charter for Nature adopted by the General Assembly as well as some provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 7 9 on the ground that the U.N. General Assembly resolutions invoked by the plaintiffs were not proper sources of customary law but "merely aspirational and were never intended to be binding on member States of the United Nations." 8 0 For informal rules adopted in other, less-representative forums than the General Assembly, the leap toward customary law is even more difficult.
Guiding Principles on Internal
Second, judicial reference to declarations and comments can be justified if such documents represent established treaty interpreta- 
1992)
84. E.g., R v. Another illustration would be the reference to the GuidingPrinciples on Internal Displacement, called Deng Principles." In a series of cases in Colombia, judges significantly relied on Deng Principles and injected the meaning to the constitutional rights. In 2000, the Colombia Constitutional Court stated that the principles should "be used as parameters for normative creation and interpretation in the field of force displacement." 9 In the subsequent 2004 decision, the same court explained the legal status of Deng Principles as compiling the provisions of international law, 9 0 based on which the court extensively relied on the principles for the determination of the scope of constitutional rights 1 From an objective point of view, the evidence may not yet be enough for Deng Principles to fully reflect customary international law or established treaty interpretation.
9 2 Rather, the Colombian court's strong endorsement for Deng Principles provides additional evidence toward the formulation of new rules of customary international law based on Deng Principles. As illustrated by these examples, many of the declarations, comments, guidelines, and reports cited by domestic courts, including those adopted by treaty monitoring bodies, cannot readily be seen as reflecting established customary international law or treaty inter- pretation. To this extent, other possible bases of the application of informal instruments need to be considered.
B. Obligation to Consider
Even when the instruments fail to reflect established customary law or treaty interpretation, domestic courts' engagement may still be based on a separate procedural obligation to consider informal international instruments, at least with regard to those adopted by human rights treaty monitoring bodies.
The applicability of such a procedural "obligation to consider" is in part illustrated by the Jamaican case of Lewis. The existence of such an "obligation to consider" is, nevertheless, controversial' 9 7 and even if such a procedural obligation exists, it would likely be limited to documents concerning particular individuals' rights. The Privy Council's above observation in Lewis was based upon the individual's right to life under the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as the constitutional guarantees regarding fair and proper procedures. 9 8 Caution must therefore be exercised in extending the procedural obligation, such as the one enunciated in Lewis, to wider contexts, such as monitoring bodies' views on individuals' human rights complaints concerning items other than the right to life, or those bodies' reports concerning items other than individuals' human rights complaints. 
C. Authorization to Consider
International law does not obligate courts to consider informal instruments but simply authorizes judges to take into account informal international instruments. Such authorization is given by Article 32 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties; states, and indirectly their courts, may take into account the findings of the treaty monitoring bodies or other informal instruments as part of a "supplementary means of interpretation."
99
In states with monist traditions, in which the Vienna Convention has domestic validity, Article 32 can serve as a formal legal basis that authorizes the reference to nonbinding instruments for the purpose of treaty interpretation (which can ultimately inform domestic law). For instance, in 2004 the Japanese Osaka District Court, in referring to some U.N. documents on the treatment of prisoners, noted that while these documents have no direct relation with and are separate from the ICCPR, they were adopted by the United Nations-of which Japan is a member-and related to the content of Article 14(3) (b) of the ICCPR. 00 On this basis, the district court observed that the U.N. documents should be taken into consideration in interpreting Article 14(3) (b) of the ICCPR as comparable to supplementary means for interpretation under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 101 In the same vein, the Japanese Supreme Court, in interpreting the JapanSingapore Tax Treaty, drew on the OECD commentary to the model tax convention as a "supplementary means of interpretation," set forth in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Committee, will be particularly relevant. 0 6 According to the explanatory memorandum of the Act, Section 32(2) of the Victorian Charter of Human Rights permits consideration of the decisions of the Human Rights Committee in the process of interpreting the domestic human rights law.
IV. PERSUASIVENESS AS A BASIS FOR JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT
While bindingness could provide a basis for judicial engagement, it does not serve all the instances of judicial engagement with informal international instruments. The documents may not reflect established customary law or treaty interpretation, and the International law provides authorization, but such international authorization may not have domestic validity, and even if it does, it does not provide a normative basis as to which specific instruments domestic courts would apply.10s
For instance, U.K courts accept and explicitly refer to Articles
Therefore, this Article moves on to consider an alternative set of normative bases for the application of informal instruments, which is grouped under the concept of "persuasiveness." As will appear below, however, the notion remains underdeveloped in terms of its concept and political underpinnings.
A. Bindingness and Persuasiveness
Persuasiveness-or in a more familiar term, the idea of "persuasive authority" 0 9 -has been used in the comparable context of interjudicial communications.
1 0 The idea of persuasiveness is contrasted with bindingness-or "binding authority" in the more common usage-which carries independent obligatory force."' A binding authority is authoritative just by virtue of its pedigree, while "persuasive authority" stems from its merit," 2 either in substance or in terms of the process by which a particular instrument was adopted. Potentially, courts may find persuasiveness in any norms (whether domestic or international, and whether binding or not) that are helpful in shedding light on the meaning and purpose of a particular domestic obligation. 1 1 3 It can be used as a concept to cover the interpretive reference to comments, declarations, and guidelines. In some cases, courts have expressly referred to the persuasiveness of particular informal instruments. Consider the case of Adan (2000) In this passage, Lord Steyn regarded the UNHCR Handbook as a "high persuasive authority" on the basis of the UNHCR's critical role in treaty application and member states' obligation to cooperate with the UNHCR.117 Likewise, the General Comments and Views of the Human Rights Committee were regarded as "authoritative" or "persuasive" in the courts of several countries, including South Africa, New Zealand, and the Netherlands.11
What constitutes persuasiveness in the eyes of courts remains unclear. This Article's limited survey has derived at least three broad criteria that determine the persuasiveness of nontreaty instruments, each of which will be explained in the following Sections. Nevertheless, it appears that these criteria do not exhaust the range of relevant factors and do not exclude the possibility that case-specific and more value-laden factors play a role in determining judicial reference to informal international instruments. It is difficult to identify such value-laden factors, as judges are by no asylum seekers who feared persecution by nonstate agents. Id. German and French authorities had interpreted Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention as applicable only to events of persecution by the state. Id. Yet, the U.K. House of Lords confirmed the broad interpretation of persecution to encompass cases in which a person is persecuted from nonstate actors and in which a state does not exist or is unable to afford the necessary protection to its citizens. means unequivocal about what factors render comments and guidelines more than mere nonbinding documents. This conceptual uncertainty pertaining to persuasiveness renders unstable the legitimacy of judicial engagement with informal instruments.
B. Association with Formal Law
A first factor that may determine the persuasiveness of informal international instruments is their association with the formal law to be interpreted. Such association can be both institutional and substantive.
Institutional Link Between Formal Law and Informal Instruments
The institutional connection is one of the elements that may render informal instruments persuasive. The New Zealand case of Mansouri-Rad,"i 9 concerning the refugee status of a homosexual man, illustrates the relevance of the institutional link. In interpreting human rights treaties, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority of New Zealand, while recognizing the controversy over the binding effect of the decisions of the human rights treaty monitoring bodies, went on to observe that "[t]he decisions of the Human Rights Committee can be at least of persuasive authority."1 20 Interestingly, the Refugee Status Appeals Authority contrasted the treaty monitoring bodies with the U.N. Human Rights Commission (now the U.N. Human Rights Council) established by the U.N. General Assembly and found the interpretive relevance only in the former. 12 1 This is in part because the latter Commission operates outside the framework of the human rights treaties. The Refugee Status Appeals Authority noted that "[i] t is almost unnecessary to add that we do not see the U.N. Human Rights Commission as an appropriate point of reference, lying as it does outside the treaty framework earlier described." 122 A similar disconnect may also be found in the reference to declarations adopted by intergovernmental forums for the purpose of interpreting particular treaties.
As illustrated by Mansouri-Rad, the institutional link is apparently present when the instruments of treaty monitoring bodies are used for the interpretation of the same treaty provisions. Recourse is also made to documents adopted by a body which is, albeit not strictly a treaty monitoring body, tasked with applying the treaty in question. Illustrative is judicial reliance on documents prepared by the UNHCR. While the UNHCR is not a treaty body for the Refugee Convention per se and its documents are not adopted within the treaty, it regularly undertakes the refugee status determination according to the convention and develops its interpretation.1 3 2 As noted above,' 3 3 the UNHCR's Handbook has been employed by domestic courts to interpret the Refugee Convention and its implementing legislation. In the above-quoted passage of Lord Steyn in Adan, the UNHCR's systematic association with formal international law in terms of law application seems to have contributed to the persuasiveness of the UNHCR Handbook.1 3 4 The UNHCR is systematically associated with the Refugee Convention and its protocol, which acknowledges its critical role and under which member states are obligated to cooperate with the body.' 
and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers (1999) .138
The judges noted that the guidelines "are to be seen as an interpretive aid, in the same way that [c]ourt decisions from other jurisdictions would be regarded." 1 3 9 As suggested by this passage, the UNHCR guidelines are treated as part of broad "foreign" resources that are nonbinding but nevertheless could assist the interpretation.
The degree of institutional linkage varies, which may impact on the degree of persuasiveness. In the New Zealand case of AttorneyGeneral v. Refugee Council of New Zealand, Judge McGrath attached greater weight to a statement of the UNHCR's Executive Committee than he did to the UNHCR Guidelines. With regard to the Executive Committee's statement, Judge McGrath observed as follows: "[the value of the 1986 statement of the Executive Committee] derives in part from the fact that the Executive Committee is itself an assembly of states which has debated the issue [regarding the obligation under Article 31.2 of the Refugee Convention] and settled on a formal statement concerning it."140 In contrast, with respect to the UNHCR Guidelines, the judge observed that they "do not however have a status in relation to interpretation of the Refugee Convention that is equal to that of the resolutions of the UNHCR Executive Committee,"141 presumably because the latter was officially adopted by the assembly of states.
Substantive Link Between Formal Law and Informal Instruments
Even if an informal international instrument is not institutionally linked to a particular formal law, national judges still find the former relevant to the construction of the latter. The medium between formal law and informal instruments is based upon substantive connection, which is often less obvious than the case of institutional link and thus depends more on judicial discretion. Domestic courts find the substantive link between formal and informal instruments in various different ways. There are at least three groups of domestic court decisions. First, courts consult the documents of international organizations and intergovernmental forums for the interpretation of the treaties, which are in substance related to such informal documents. An illustrative instance is Director of the Public Prosecutions KwaZulu-Natal v. P, in which the South African Supreme Court of Appeal interpreted the Convention on the Rights of the Child by consulting a U.N. General Assembly resolution. 142 The court drew on the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which constituted the basis for the relevant constitutional provision (Section 28) ,'4 and observed that "the convention has to be considered in conjunction with other international instruments," including the 1985 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly. 14 4 In a similar vein, the Supreme Court of British Columbia (Canada) in the aforementioned Victoria (City) v. Adams, 145 when interpreting the scope of Section 7 of the Canadian Charter, invoked not only the ICESCR and its general comment but also the Habitat II's Habitat Agenda, 1 46 which addressed "adequate shelter for all" as a theme of global importance.1 4 7 As another example, the Japanese Supreme Court interpreted the Japan-Singapore Tax Treaty by drawing on the OECD Model Tax Convention-upon which the Japan-Singapore Tax Treaty is based-and the commentary to the model tax convention, prepared by the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs.
14 8 In these exam- ples, courts import U.N. resolutions and conference outcome documents without systematic association to the treaties.
Second, domestic courts have also found a substantive link between informal international instruments and the interpretation of domestic law per se, without the medium of customary international law or treaties (as was in the British case of Adanl 4 9 ) or in conjunction with custom or treaties (like the Canadian case of Victoria v. Adamso 50 ). This seems to have been the reasoning adopted by the Cyprus Supreme Court in Constantinou. 5 There, the Cyprus Supreme Court had to decide whether the applicant, who was deaf and intellectually disabled from birth, was a "disabled person" for the purpose of importing a duty-free motor vehicle. The court regarded the definition as the "generally accepted sense of the term." 15 5 Finally, judges employ the documents not as specific interpretive guides to treaties or domestic law but rather to shape the general direction of judicial reasoning. While the instruments included in this category are ultimately used to construe international or domestic law, the linkage between formal and informal instruments would be diluted if the latter serves as general guidance. For instance, courts have invoked instruments to stress the importance of particular rights or interests. In Mosethanyane, the residents of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), who are part of the Basarwa communities, instituted court actions against the government that had terminated the provision of water to the Basarwa communities. Id. The court decided in favor of the residents, which claimed the right to abstract water. Id. The court's finding was primarily based on the construction of domestic law (the Water Act). Id. paras. 13-18. Yet, the court also touched on the resident's claim regarding the violation of the right not to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment (provided in Section 7(1) of the Botswana Constitution). Id. In interpreting the constitutional right, the court has drawn on the two informal international instruments mentioned above. Id. In this case, the international instruments were invoked to show the international consensus on the importance of access to water, and such consensus informed the value judgment involved in the interpretation of the constitutional right. These cases illustrate that, in contrast to justification based on bindingness-which can be traced to an objective assessment of a source-justification based on the qualities of the nature of the body and/or the procedure is a much more subjective assessment, which may lead to different evaluations in different courts.
D. Wider Domestic and International Acceptance
Finally, there is some evidence that some courts have considered wider public acceptance as a factor that would determine persuasiveness of a particular international informal instrument. In Constantinou, a Cyprus court relied on U.N. General Assembly resolutions to construe the concept of terms under domestic law, presumably because the resolutions define "the generally accepted sense of the term." 7 4 Whose acceptance matters for the courts, however, varies depending on each case. At the same time, domestic courts invoke instruments based upon acceptance by the larger international community. The Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court in Elmorsi' 77 invoked treaties and a series of U.N. resolutions concerning the promotion of the rights of disabled persons to strengthen the particular reading of domestic law, despite that neither party invoked international norms in their arguments. 17 8 According to the Egyptian court, U.N. resolutions provide proof of the current trend in the international community toward greater recognition of the rights of the disabled, which the court found could not be disregarded by national authorities. In a similar vein, the Court of Appeal of the Republic of Botswana in Mosetlhanyaneso invoked a general comment and the Human Rights Council's resolution as some of the materials to demonstrate the existence of "international consensus" on the importance of access to water. 8 1 There is, however, apparently a great difference among nontreaty instruments in terms of the representational value of international community. A U.N. General Assembly resolution, if adopted by consensus or with the affirmative vote of most member states, more convincingly demonstrates international consensus than the resolutions of more restrictive international organizations.
Wider international acceptance was also one of the grounds for the interpretive use of the U.N. General Assembly resolution by the Takamatsu High Court of Japan in its 1997 judgment. . 9, 1988) . In making reference to the Body of Principles, the high court acknowledged that it is difficult to consider that the relevant provision in the Body of Principles falls under "subsequent practice" under Article 31(3) (b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Takamatsu Human Rights Committee opinions as interpretive guidance on Article 14(1) of the ICCPR.i 3 In making reference to the Body of Principles, the court observed that the principles are "international standards for the protection of detainees," paying attention to the fact that the principles were drafted by experts, were acceptable by almost all states, and were adopted after deliberate consideration without any positive objections.1 8 4
Likewise, in the aforementioned example of the Colombian court decisions regarding the rights of the internally displaced persons, the Colombian Constitutional Court referred to the international recognition given to Deng Principles by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations.1 8 5
These rather nonsubstantive factors are likely, but by no means determinate, elements that constitute persuasiveness in the eyes of particular courts. We can presume that there are more value-laden factors that are case specific and reflect the subjective views of judges. The presence of case-specific and value-laden factors can be suggested, for instance, by the varied approaches taken by the U.K. House of Lords' judges to the observations of U.N. human rights treaty monitoring bodies. In Jones v. Saudi Arabia, as noted above, Lord Bingham and Lord Hoffmann dismissed the relevance of the country-specific observations of the Committee Against Torture. 18 6 By contrast, in European Roma Rights Centre, before the U.K.
House of Lords, Baroness Hale accommodated in her separate opinion the concluding observations of the Committee Against the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (which expressed concern over discrimination in immigration laws and practices). 187 Some case-specific and value-laden factors might have played a role in these judges' varied engagement with the monitoring bodies' observations.
The conceptual elusiveness of persuasiveness can enclose multiple factors therein, which further weakens the just value of persuasiveness as a general concept. The uncertainty in the normative basis of judicial practices, at least in part, explains why some courts are less willing to engage with informal international instruments, as this Article will explore in the next Part.
V. THE VARIANCE IN JUDICIAL AMENABILITY TO INFORMAL INSTRUMENTS
A. Varied judicial Amenability
Our study of court decisions revealed not only the judicial use of declarations, general comments, reports, and so forth, but also the variations in the judicial amenability to these documents. Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and other common law countries tend to be less hesitant to employ instruments based upon their persuasiveness.1 88 As noted above,1 89 the courts of the United Kingdom and New Zealand treated the UNHCR Handbook and the opinions of the Human Rights Committee as persuasive and authoritative and thus applicable to their judicial reasoning.1 90 The Supreme Court of British Columbia in Victoria (City) v. Adams, in which the court invoked treaties and pertinent informal instruments, observed that the reference to international covenants is proper because the court is not enforcing various international instruments that do not form part of the domestic law of Canada but rather is informed by those instruments. 191 The case acknowledged the informative value of international instruments in constructing judgments. 192 The relatively lower threshold that some common law countries have toward informal international instruments can be contrasted with countries following civil law traditions. The French Conseil d'Etat emphasized in its 2001 decision that the Human Rights Committee was a nonjudicial organ whose findings were not binding. 193 The same reluctance is also evident in Japanese courts. The courts often ignore or reject the arguments based on nonbinding documents, unless the judges find those documents reflect customary international law or established treaty interpretation. 
B. Reasons for the Variance: Three Tentative Accounts
A number of historical, conceptual, and pragmatic factors lead to the varied judicial amenability to informal international instruments. While this Article does not conduct any detailed analysis on the reasons for the variations, the cases examined give rise to at least three preliminary explanations as to why some courts are more willing to employ the instruments while others are not.
First, the uncertainty in the notion of persuasiveness may lead to courts being seen as arbitrary, and therefore judges maintain caution in determining whether to invoke informal international instruments. As contrasted with the notion of bindingness, persuasiveness appears nascent in terms of underlying ideas and reasons as to why judges can consult instruments based on their virtue of persuasiveness. The weakness of the concept has also been discussed within the context of interjudicial communication. Knop critically observed that debates on persuasive authority tend to presuppose the goodness in the application of international law and the reference to the foreign judgments of liberal democratic states. 203 This critical observation might apply to judicial practices on informal instruments, as well as to the academic understanding about such practices. The broad social acceptance of the goodness in international law and institutions would likely encourage litigants, and eventually judges, to invoke declarations, general comments, and international guidelines to support their case. contrary, if international law and institutions are socially seen as unfair or unnecessary, this may distance litigants and judges from nontreaty instruments that they are not obliged to follow. Second, the variance can also be ascribed to the rigorousness of the separation of powers between the judiciary and the political branches of government. The application of informal international instruments may signify the judicial encroachment on the authority of legislative and executive bodies endowed with democratic legitimacy because they would channel international norms into the domestic order without being intermediated by the legislative or executive approval processes. Some courts indeed refuse to give effect to nontreaty instruments because of judicial intrusion on the authority of political organs. For instance, the Sri Lanka Supreme Court in Singarasa rejected giving effect to the findings of the Human Rights Committee on the ground that the legislature has not taken measures to give effect to the rights under the ICCPR.
2 0 4 Likewise, the Court of Appeal of Singapore in Yong Vui Kong acknowledged the "inherent limits" in resorting to consistent interpretation; the reference to international human rights norms would not be appropriate if it was inconsistent with the express wording of the Singapore Constitution or the country's constitutional history. 205 The Singapore court cited Lord Bingham's comments made in Reyes 20 6 that "[it is open to the people of any country to lay down the rules by which they wish their state to be governed and they are not bound to give effect in their Constitution to norms and standards accepted elsewhere, perhaps in very different societies." 20 7 It would have been necessary for parliament to first enact new laws or amend the Singapore Constitution to give effect to 204. Singarasa v. Attorney General, 138 I.L.R. 451 (2006) (Sri Lanka). In Singarasa, the petitioner was convicted of conspiracy to overthrow the Sri Lankan government. Id. The petitioner has brought the matter to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, which found that Sri Lanka had violated some provisions of the ICCPR. Id. Based on the committee's views, the petitioner argued that he had a legitimate expectation that the committee's findings would be given effect by the Supreme Court. Id. at 478. The court rejected this argument based on legitimate expectations by pointing out that the legislature had not taken measures to give effect to the rights under the ICCPR. In this case, the appellant claimed that the mandatory death penalty for drug trafficking was unconstitutional. Id. As a matter of principle, the Singapore Court of Appeal has agreed that domestic law, including the Singapore Constitution, should be interpreted consistently with Singapore's international legal obligations as far as possible. Id. Nevertheless, the court pointed out the limits to consistent interpretation. Id. international human rights norms. 208 From these judgments, one could argue that the more faithful the judicial organs are to the separation of powers and the legislative authority of political organs, the less amenable the courts are to informal international instruments. For instance, in the United Kingdom, judges historically enjoy a privileged presence and make rules through their own jurisprudence,209 which would be one of the factors that facilitate the judicial invocation of informal international instruments.
Finally, the varied amenability to the use of informal international instruments and to the idea of persuasiveness might bespeak the differences among states and judges on the rigorousness of the distinction between bindingness and persuasiveness. From our survey of domestic court decisions, we have witnessed that national courts sometimes group together treaties and informal instruments under the same heading of "international instruments" and do not always find it necessary to add explanations for why informal instruments are cited. For instance, in the Kenyan case of RM, the Kenya High Court referred to the general comment as part of "International Instruments."210 Some courts or judges are thus less sensitive about the separation between bindingness and persuasiveness, even in their judicial reasoning, which seems to be the last stronghold of such a distinction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The normative roles assigned to domestic courts are subject to changes by the transitions in international and domestic societies. In the international context, formal law and informal norms develop and operate side-by-side. 211 The development of informal international instruments alongside the expansion of formal international law has influenced the exercise of authority by domestic organs, including domestic courts. While treaty monitoring bodies and international organizations produced a voluminous number of informal international instruments, their effectiveness often relies on the actions voluntarily taken at the domestic level. Various informal instruments adopted by intergovernmental forums also anticipate the necessary actions to be taken at the domestic level to realize the goals of those instruments. This study of domestic court decisions demonstrates that national courts have not been ignorant to the mounting international expectation that domestic organs will materialize the informality.
Domestic courts' engagement in applying nontreaty instruments has been facilitated not only from international expectation toward domestic organs but also by the demand of domestic constituencies. In court proceedings, not surprisingly, each party will bring as many materials as possible to support their arguments. If specific comments, declarations, and guidelines issued by treaty monitoring bodies and international organizations are widely known to domestic communities, there is strong incentive for litigants to argue that those instruments support their contention. Judges will continue to hear these arguments, and informal international instruments may eventually appear within the reasoning of hesitant courts.
Domestic courts' incremental engagement in informal instruments, however, may be normatively problematic at the domestic level. The judges are applying instruments that lack formal approval by legislative and/or executive bodies. The gravity of tension between judicial and other branches of government varies based on how the instruments are employed, the types of instruments invoked, and the weight accorded to those instruments among interpretive variables. The interpretive use of informal instruments requires greater justification than the evidential reference to them. The justification is called for if an informal instrument carries conclusive weight among interpretive variables. Stronger justification is needed if domestic courts apply informal instruments adopted outside the specific treaty that a court seeks to interpret.
This Article has argued that an alternative justification for the invocation of informal international law is the notion of the instruments' persuasiveness, as opposed to their bindingness. The former presumes that the authority is a matter of degree, while the latter is based on the binary model. While the manner in which judges refer to persuasiveness is by no means uniform, in general, the systematic association with formal law-the judicial nature of the body and procedure according to which the instruments are adopted-and the wider acceptance of informal instruments would likely determine the persuasiveness of informal instruments in the eyes of domestic courts. Yet, the notion of persuasiveness is still underdeveloped as justification for the practices of domestic courts. The notion may lack the political underpinnings as to why domestic courts can invoke persuasiveness in the first place. The weak theoretical backbones for persuasiveness resulted in and from the varied amenability among states to the idea of persuasiveness and the associated discretion of judges. In part, the systematic association with formal law-from which national courts may indirectly gain their legitimacy to employ nontreaty standards for judicial reasoning-sustains the instruments' persuasiveness.
The permeation of informal international instruments into domestic courts would likely continue due to the growing international and domestic expectation placed on national judges. While in many jurisdictions domestic courts still resist in combining formality with informality in their decisions, the growing judicial practices to realize nontreaty instruments at the domestic level may incrementally mobilize skeptical judges to consult those instruments.
The continuing application of informal instruments by domestic courts has normative and legal effects at the international level. The domestic courts' application of informal instruments first strengthens the normativity of those instruments at the international level and may encourage other states and international organizations to follow them, despite the lack of formal legal binding force. The respect that domestic courts have paid to the instruments may further serve to strengthen the authority of international bodies and networks that have promulgated those instruments.
In addition, domestic courts' reference to informal instruments helps turn those instruments into formal international law-albeit, only in a remote sense. Domestic court decisions are, after all, state acts.
2 1 2 Within this limited venue, domestic courts' decisions convert informal international instruments into part of formal international law. National case law can contribute to both the for- The international normative impact of domestic practices suggests that the application of informal international instruments, precisely because it remains a largely unregulated undertaking by domestic courts, empowers domestic courts in the development of international regulation. While domestic courts have long been a submerged presence in a single "state" unit, which is supposed to be a monolithic actor in the process of development of international law, domestic courts are no longer the mere spokespersons of the legislative or executive bodies. Insofar as domestic courts apply informal international instruments, they are better regarded as an autonomous normative enterprise in developing international regulation sustained by both formality and informality. 
